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The Faster You Copy, the Less You Infringe:
Beating Copyrights Without Fair Use
David Overcash *
A. INTRODUCTION
It required a strange lawsuit involving three groups of litigants, includ-
ing parties described as "defendants-counter-claim-plaintiffs-third party
plaintiffs-appellants," to resolve a copyright dispute over a TiVo-like service
offered by a cable company.' The lawsuit boils down to this: a host of televi-
sion content providers and copyright holders-including Cartoon Network,
Universal Studios, Twentieth Century Fox, and Disney-brought suit alleg-
ing direct copyright infringement by CSC Holdings and Cablevision, Inc.
(collectively "Cablevision"), who provide a "Remote Storage DVR System"
("RS-DVR") for their customers' use.2 The RS-DVR allows users to select
television programs to record on remote equipment that Cablevision owns
and operates at a remote site, which are then available for later playback at
the touch of a button.3
The case arrives before the Second Circuit on appeal of an award for
summary judgment to the content-provider plaintiffs.4 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted injunctive re-
lief, barring Cablevision from operating the RS-DVR system without first
obtaining licenses from its content providers.5 The Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that: 1) the cable company's copies were not "fixed" suffi-
ciently to meet the Copyright Act's ("the Act") definition of "copy;" 2) the
customers actually "made" the copies, therefore the cable company is not
liable directly under the Act; and 3) the RS-DVR's playback transmissions
are not performances "to the public" and do not infringe any exclusive right
under the Act.6
The Second Circuit's second and third holdings are relatively simple to
understand due to the RS-DVR's similarity to a more primitive system em-
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2010;
B.A. Chemistry (with Biology minor) from Texas A&M University at College
Station, 1996. Special thanks are offered to Professor Lackland Bloom for his
guidance on approaching this topic.
1. See Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 124-25.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 124.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 130-33 (first two holdings regarding creation of copies), 139 (third
holding on public performance).
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ploying common videocassette recorders and telephones.7 The RS-DVR
does not create a "copy" until a customer makes an active request and that
copy appears as a playback viewable only by that customer, which does not
qualify as "a performance to the public" under the Act. 8 The court's first
holding is vulnerable to more criticism and likely invites abuse; it seems
dependent both upon the specific characteristics of the RS-DVR technology
itself, via an analogy to the random access memory ("RAM") of computer
systems, and the lifespan and utility of the copies stored on the system. 9
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Cablevision's business involves aggregating television programming
from content providers and transmitting those programs to customers, via
coaxial cable, in a single data stream.' 0 Generally, this transmission occurs
in real-time, and customers are only able to view programs when the content
provider schedules its broadcast.''
The new RS-DVR system changes this limitation. The single data
stream is split as half is immediately routed to customers and the other half
enters a "Broadband Media Router" ("BMR") that buffers the data, reformats
it, and sends it to a server with many high-capacity hard disks.12 The server
then determines whether a customer requested that program, and if so, moves
it through another buffer to a hard disk designated to the customer.13 The
first buffering process retains only one tenth of a second worth of program-
ming from any given channel, after which different data erases and replaces
it. 14 The BMR only contains 1.2 seconds worth of programming at any given
time. 15
The district court noted that "the RS-DVR is not a single piece of equip-
ment" as it is a multi-part system, requiring dedicated computers and twenty-
four hour maintenance staff.16 This complexity is inconsequential to the ser-
vice's customers-they operate the system in the same fashion as a standard
7. See generally id.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding manufacturer not liable for infringement as
"time-shifting" function of Betamax VCR satisfies fair use requisites).
8. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139.
9. Id. at 129-30.





15. Id. at 124-25.
16. Id. at 125 (citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp.,
478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
[Vol. XII
Beating Copyrights Without Fair Use
set-top DVR with their remote control.,7 The RS-DVR's method of opera-
tion is nearly identical to a video-on-demand service ("VOD") where cus-
tomers request the transmission of content stored at the cable company's
remote facility.18 The difference is that the user can only play back content
they selected earlier for recording, which occurs according to the general
broadcast transmission schedule.19 Cablevision's RS-DVR service only
records programs from channels offered by the company and subscribed to
by the customer. 20 Cablevision considered further limiting the available
channels. Although they had the capacity, they chose not to during develop-
ment.2 1 Cablevision offered this service without paying any additional li-
cense fees to the content providers.22
C. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
A host of television content providers filed the case in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.23 The tripartite claim
was limited to only direct infringement claims against Cablevision, who
waived any fair-use defense.24
The first claim alleged Cablevision's RS-DVR system directly infringed
the exclusive right of reproduction for protected works under the Act through
the creation of "copies" in the data buffering system. 25 Second, the process
of writing the programs to the server hard disks ("playback copies") alleg-
edly was a direct infringement of the exclusive reproduction right.26 Finally,
the plaintiffs argued that transmission of these recordings in response to a
customer request was a direct infringement of the exclusive right of public
performance.27
D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Southern District of New York awarded summary judgment for
plaintiffs on all three infringement claims.28 The court granted plaintiffs re-





22. See generally id. at 124.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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lief by issuing an injunction that barred defendant from employing the RS-
DVR system without first acquiring licenses from the content providers.29
Cablevision appealed this judgment to the Second Circuit.30
E. HOLDING OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment for the defendants-a complete reversal war-
ranting a detailed examination of the district court's holdings.31 The lower
court's first holding relied on the evaluation of the RS-DVR process as a
whole, noting the "aggregate effect of the buffering was to reproduce the
entirety of Cablevision's programming."32 The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the data was not "fixed" and, therefore, the buffer data could
not be "copies" under the Act.33 The trial court reduced the second claim to a
question of "who makes the copies?"34 The district court analyzed different
stages of the process and determined that Cablevision was the dominant actor
since it had "unfettered discretion" over the available content, owned and
maintained the physical components of the RS-DVR, and had a "continuing
relationship" with the customers. 35 This analysis found infringement through
copying, despite the mandatory participation of a customer in requesting the
recording's making.36 Finally, Cablevision's concession that the playback
responding to the customer's request was a "performance" somewhat simpli-
fied the third infringement claim.37 Despite this concession, the court below
rejected Cablevision's two part argument that this performance was: 1) per-
formed by the customer, not Cablevision; and 2) not performed "to the pub-
lic" since only individual customers received it.38 The district court
dispensed with the former part of the defense's argument on the same basis
as the second infringement claim.39 By relying on a prior case from the
Northern District of California-which held that if a commercial relationship
between the transmitter of a performance and the audience exists, then such
transmission is "to the public,"-the court rejected the latter part because the
29. Id. at 126.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 140.
32. Id. at 125.
33. Id.
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"same program" would transmit to the "members of the public, who may
receive the performances at different times."40
The Court of Appeals used a similar approach to organize the content
providers' infringement by discussing its holdings in terms of the plaintiffs'
allegedly infringed rights: reproduction and public performance.4' The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the court below and granted summary judgment to
Cablevision with respect to both rights.42 The appellate court, resolving the
holding of reproduction infringement, based its reversal on the span of time
the programs spent in the RS-DVR system's buffers and the determination of
whose "volition" produced the copies.43 The court discarded the second type
of injury, which was based on unauthorized public performance, after deter-
mining the defendant was entitled to summary judgment because each trans-
mission was made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy produced
by that subscriber."4
F. RATIONALE
In its resolution of the reproduction violations, the Second Circuit held
that the district court ignored significant portions of the Act and relied upon
inadequate case law to address the issues at hand.a5 The court found the
precise definitions of terms within § 101 of the Act controlling for the ques-
tion of whether RS-DVR's buffering system directly infringes plaintiffs'
copyrights, specifically the definition of the term "fixed."46 The Second Cir-
cuit criticized the court below for ignoring what it referred to as the second
prong of the definition, "[flor a period of more than transitory duration."47
While reluctant to explain exactly what it thought a "transitory duration"
might be, the court found that the RS-DVR buffer system's retention of the
data for no more than 1.2 seconds before overwriting it does not "embody"
the copyrighted works long enough to trigger a violation of the Act.48 The
Second Circuit also wrote that the district court's holding improperly relied
on certain cases when evaluating the second infringement by reproduction
claim, namely that the copying of data from the server buffer to the hard
40. Id.; see also On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F.
Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
41. See generally Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 121.
42. Id. at 140.
43. See id. at 130-32.
44. See id. at 139-40.
45. See id. at 139.
46. Id. at 127; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2008).
47. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127.
48. Id. at 129-30.
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disks constituted copying in violation of the Act.49 The appellate court re-
jected the district court's belief that Netcom was limited strictly to the
"unique attributes of the Internet," and instead followed the approach of the
Fourth Circuit, which found Netcom to be "a particularly rational application
of § 106" of the Act.50 In addition, the court found the comparison of the
copyshop in Princeton University Press inapplicable to the present situation;
instead of customers placing orders with a human copyshop employee, users
of the RS-DVR system trigger processes within an automated system, which
never implicates the "volition" of Cablevision.51 While these differences
alone might have justified the Second Circuit's decision, the court further
criticized the district court by applying its own analogy to Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., which involved Betamax VCR technology,
and found the existence of a "continuing relationship" between the cable
company and the customer more relevant to contributory liability, which the
plaintiffs claim specifically excluded.52
In reversing the district court's decision regarding infringement by pub-
lic performance of a protected work, the Second Circuit again looked to
§ 101 of the Act for guidance regarding the precise definition of "public per-
formance."53 The court found that the definition required an inquiry into
who was "capable of receiving" the transmission of protected material.54 The
Second Circuit supported its conclusion by analyzing the House Report on
the 1976 Copyright Act, and emphasized the use of the phrases "by transmis-
sion to the public at large" and "potential recipients of the transmission."55
Applying principles distilled from the Act itself and the House Report, the
appellate court reversed the finding of the court below, declaring that it
"Ic]annot reconcile the district court's approach with the language of the
transmit clause."56 The individualized nature of the selections of recorded
programming and the discrete copies of material used by each consumer
49. Id. at 130-33.
50. Id. at 131; see also 17 U.S.C.A § 106 (West 2008); CoStar Group, Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549-551 (4th Cir. 2004); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
51. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131-32. See generally Princeton Univ. Press v.
Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding copy
shop's creation of course packs was not fair use).
52. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132-13. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
53. Id. at 134.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 135; see also H.R. Rep. No 94-1476 (1976).
56. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 135.
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were dispositive facts to the Second Circuit, which held that the use of the
RS-DVR does not constitute a private performance.57
G. CRITIQUE
To reach its first two holdings, the Second Circuit references three dif-
ferent technologies it somewhat analogizes to the RS-DVR system: videocas-
sette recorders, photocopiers, and computer random access memory
("RAM").58 While the court had only direct infringement claims before it,
this limitation neither supports its reasoning, nor explains the court's strained
reading of Section 101.59
First, the court parses the definition of "fixed" provided in Section 101
into two requirements: "embodiment" and "duration," before evaluating the
district court's rationale based in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc,
a computer RAM case. 60 This construction is accomplished by isolating the
phrase "for a period of more than a transitory duration" from the rest of the
definition and insisting that it have meaning independent of the surrounding
terms.6' Purpose can be found for these words without requiring it to stand
entirely independent; it can be viewed as elaborating or qualifying the terms
it follows, particularly "copied, perceived, or communicated."62 This lan-
guage, given the formerly exclusive importance of the term "fixed" to the
question of creation of a work, can be given meaning in conjunction with
these terms, a position strongly supported by the legislative record.63 The
57. Id. at 139.
58. Id. at 128-33.
59. Id. at 124.
60. Id. at 127; see also MAI Computer Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding computer programs stored temporarily in RAM are
fixed copies).
61. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127.
62. The full text of the definition provides:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodi-
ment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.
A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is
"fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2008).
63. In discussion of the definition of "fixed" as amended by the Act, the Report
states:
Thus, assuming it is copyrightable-as a 'motion picture' or 'sound re-
cording,' for example-the content of a live transmission, should be re-
garded as fixed and should be accorded statutory protection if it is being
20091
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House Committee on the Judiciary Report on the 1976 Copyright Act's ("the
Report") definition of "fixed" discusses the term in the context of creating
copyrighted works (such as live sports broadcasts). The second sentence of
the definition provides that if a recording is being made at the same time as it
is transmitted, it is automatically "fixed" to qualify for statutory protection.64
The House of Representatives emphasizes throughout the Report its intent to
craft the 1976 Act in such a way as to accommodate technological advance-
ment without requiring the definitions to be changed repeatedly.65 The Re-
port explicitly describes an intention to allow a means by which the entity
broadcasting a live sporting event of transitory and unpredicted form-un-
doubtedly, a modern creative work involving legions of cameramen, com-
mentators, and directors- to simultaneously "fix" the broadcast sufficiently
to sustain the traditional copyright requirements.66 It is extraordinarily un-
likely that the authors of Section 101 contemplated that advances in data
storage and transmission would result in the words "transitory duration" be-
ing employed to chop Cablevision's efficient, profit-driven, mass reproduc-
tion process into pieces small enough that, for a period of less than two
seconds, there are no "copies" justifying relief.67 In support of its view, the
Second Circuit states that the MAI Systems finding of copying does not mean
that data loaded into RAM "always results in copying" and therefore does
not forbid its splitting of the "fixed" definition.68 The court disposes the U.S.
Copyright Office's 2001 DMCA Report regarding this matter by pointing out
recorded simultaneously with its transmission. On the other hand, the defi-
nition of 'fixation' would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or
transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured mo-
mentarily in the 'memory' of a computer. There is a grammatical error in
the cited source, must be repeated in the quote as well.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 52-53 (1976).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., id. at 47-53.
66. Id. at 52-53.
67. The House Report avoids dividing the verbs of the definition from the duration
clause when it quotes from Section 106-note the use of quotation marks in the
following excerpt:
'Reproduction' under clause (1) of section 106 is to be distinguished from
'display' under clause (5). For a work to be 'reproduced,' its fixation in
tangible form must be 'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.'
Id. at 62.
68. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir.
2008).
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that it is inconsistent with its bisecting of the definition.69 Only one case is
mentioned by the Second Circuit in support of this view, and while that deci-
sion is similar in some of its discussion of the statute, it ignores a crucial
factual distinction: unlike the internet service provider in CoStar Group, Inc.
v. LoopNet, Inc., the RS-DVR buffer exists for the express purpose of pro-
ducing copies, not a retransmission service which incidentally makes tempo-
rary copies of data as it moves it along.70 Therefore, instead of applying the
clause "for more than a transitory duration" to prevent the assertion of copy-
right protection to a unfixed or temporary work incapable of reproduction,
the result is to deny relief to owners of already fixed and copyrighted works
from a mass-reproduction process because it is too fast. The production of
copies is so rapid and efficient that "master" copies of the work are no longer
needed by those seeking to profit from unauthorized reproduction in willful
disregard of valid and exclusive copyrights.
The court's holding about playback copies relies heavily on analogies to
using a VCR or photocopier and appears reasonable at first blush. However,
the Second Circuit's treatment of the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs
surrounding the Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communi-
cation Services and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Ser-
vices decisions is somewhat perplexing.7, The court appropriately rejected
the district court's reading of Netcom, which felt the reach of that case was
limited to the Internet.72 However, stating that "[v]olitional conduct is an
important element of direct liability," the Second Circuit focuses on the voli-
tion required to initiate the creation of a copy; the Netcom court also found
the volition of the service provider at the time the service was created to be
critical.3 The court makes a brief mention of the volitional conduct in the
design of the RS-DVR system, but entirely drops the issue in its rush to a
series of comparisons between RS-DVR users and VCR users.74 This incom-
plete analysis is likely due to the lack of a claim of contributory infringement
against Cablevision, but it is nonetheless troublesome. More disturbing to
69. Id. at 129; see also U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Section 104 Report 111
(Aug. 2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-
104-report-vol- 1.pdf.
70. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121, 129; but see CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loop-
Net, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) ("the entire system functions solely
to transmit the user's data to the Internet").
71. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130-33.
72. Id. at 131; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (remarking finding of direct in-
fringement would lead to "unreasonable liability" in the context of internet
newsgroup servers).
73. Compare Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121, 130-33 with Netcom, 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1368-70.
74. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131.
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copyright holders is the Second Circuit's conclusion that Cablevision, by au-
tomating the process and allowing the customer to press the button, is not the
entity who "makes" the copies.75 This approach appears to permit escape
from direct liability through use of a suitably mechanized or computerized
device, even if the sole function of the machine is to make copies of copy-
righted works.76 Further, while the court focuses on "volition," it never ex-
plains why vicarious liability for the infringement cannot be found by virtue
of the ownership of the RS-DVR, as Section 106 of the Copyright Act does
not require that any infringement of the exclusive rights be intentional.77
Unlike the VCR, which was found in Sony to have substantial non-in-
fringing uses qualifying its manufacturer for the defense of fair use, the RS-
DVR "[e]xists only to produce a copy" and no fair use was claimed by the
defendants.78 The court reversed the finding of Cablevision's liability be-
cause the intentional copying was automated, unlike Netcom, whose technol-
ogy created copies "necessary to have a working system for transmitting
Usenet postings to and from the Internet."79
The RS-DVR allows entities such as Cablevision to transform a license
for a one-time prescheduled broadcast into a monthly fee service permitting
an infinite number of discrete rebroadcast by merely automating the process
and quickly destroying the materials used to make the playback copy. The
state of technology was much more limited and expensive at the time of the
Sony decision, where the majority opinion that the non-infringing "time-
shifting" utility of the Betamax vastly surpassed its capacity for distribution
of unlawful copies by customers.80 The capacity of consumer media prod-
ucts is profoundly greater today: there exists affordable digital technology
that permits an infinite number of copies to be made, which suffer no degra-
dation in quality, and can be made instantly available to the world with the
75. id. at 131-32.
76. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131; but see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
77. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2009).
78. Compare Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121 with Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F.
Supp. 2d 607, 616 (explaining Cablevision's waiver of fair use defense).
79. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
80. The Central District of California's findings of fact at the heart of Sony include
some illustrative numbers: Betamax recorders "range in price from approxi-
mately $875-$ 1000" and the longest cassette tape made by Sony cost "approxi-
mately $21" and allowed three hours of recording. See, e.g., Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (D.C. Cal. 1979).
The price of achieving vastly superior technology in today's marketplace is
staggeringly lower, even before adjustment of these figures to account for
inflation.
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click of a button. Many "TiVo-like" DVR systems have the ability to export
stored content to a connected recording device. Whether or not the RS-DVR
system provides a similar utility, it is a simple operation to insert your re-
cording device, be it a personal computer or a DVD-ROM burner, between
the DVR and the television set in order to create your undoubtedly "fixed"
master copy. While content providers could begin accounting for this during
negotiations for an initial broadcast agreement, it has grave consequences to
the worth of existing licenses for one-time broadcast and the value of "video-
on-demand" licenses.
The Second Circuit's discussion of the phrase, "to the public," in the
transmit clause turns again into a discussion of the "copies," and its holding
requires the acceptance of a bizarre result. If the number of RS-DVR users
reaches a million, a creative work theoretically protected by an exclusive
performance right could be broadcast from a single location and simultane-
ously viewed by an average of seven hundred people a minute without ever
being a public performance. The desire to avoid an arbitrary minimum num-
ber of persons to form a floor for the "public" determination should not allow
an infringer to partition his conduct merely by making many individual cop-
ies of open-ended lifespan on the hard disks, which can be watched at a
whim. Courts are understandably reluctant to call a direct transmission of
data into an individual living room, regardless of the number of occupants,
"public." The effect of that reluctance is the equivalent of treating the theft
of ten thousand dollars as de minimis when rounded to the "nearest billion"
or calling it "a mere million pennies."
H. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
The Second Circuit's opinion raises several questions that remain unan-
swered, either because they were not addressed by the parties in the proceed-
ings below, or were simply not necessary to the court's opinion. The
implications of each are profound.
First, what about direct infringement by the customer? The Second Cir-
cuit's disposal of the "who makes the copies" question certainly implies the
RS-DVR customer. It seems indisputable that the programs stored on the
hard disks are "copies" under the Act; the next question would be whether
the copying by customer can be justified under fair use or other defenses to
infringement. In light of the various technological advances since the Sony
decision, the argument of "substantial non-infringing uses" of the RS-DVR
preventing contributory liability appears weak. Additionally, the issue of
whether "archiving" by the public infringes upon copyrights has not been
resolved in the twenty-plus years since Sony, and today's technology is
vastly superior to the new-at-the-time Betamax.
Directly related to this first question is another: If the customer is di-
rectly infringing protected works, does Cablevision illegally contribute to
that infringement? This question, not addressed as it was not argued in the
proceedings below, seems to require an affirmative answer. Cablevision has
provided its RS-DVR customers with an automated system by which they
2009]
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can transform an authorized public performance of copyrighted work, the
original broadcast schedule, into an embodiment stable enough to be "per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" and preserved indefinitely
in the customer's designated hard drive space.
Finally, if holding data for 1.2 seconds in a buffer cannot be copying
and undeniable copies are ignored when the process is automated and set in
motion by another, does that mean all direct copyright violations can be
dodged with insertion of an overwriting buffer system into the means of re-
production? Federal protections for printed work-the foundation technol-
ogy underneath the premises of the Copyright Clause-will disappear with
construction of a robot to rapidly copy books by hand: one which creates a
intermediate copy of individual pages, from which it makes numerous copies
to be assembled and bound for the customer, and destroys the "buffer" copy
afterward. Instead of charging fees for delivering a copy of the book, fees
could be collected for use of your "scribe" robot, or any automated system
which only exists to create copies and upon command given by customers,
the use of which would prevent any finding of direct infringement for the
creation of the copies, regardless of the owner or manufacturer's intent to
circumvent licensing requirements. At least in the Second Circuit, the an-
swer appears to be clear: anyone can generate infinite copies that achieve
absolution through automation, so long as you quickly enough forget what
you did.
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